China “Will Not Invade” – A Skeptical View of the Recycled Threat Narrative

In an era besieged by hardline discourse on China, this essay reexamines the question, “Does China even intend to invade?” Drawing from history, organizational epistemology, and the internal logic of international politics, it offers an alternative view of security.

Author: Holmes (Koichi Kamachi)

Tags: #China #Security #ThreatNarrative #Aggression #EmmanuelTodd #Milanovic #OrganizationalEpistemology #YushiEnta #IkujiroNonaka

I. Background: The Expanding ‘China Threat’ Narrative

One of the most pervasive and often unexamined assumptions in contemporary international politics is that “China will eventually launch a military invasion.”

In political and media narratives—especially in Japan and the United States—scenarios such as a Taiwan conflict, China’s maritime expansion, and presumed hegemonic ambitions are often framed as inevitable developments.

In Japan, discussions on national security—both in policymaking and journalism—are framed by the phrase “We must be prepared.” Behind this imperative lies a presumption: that China is becoming increasingly expansionist and that an invasion of Taiwan is only a matter of time.

But is this assumption truly valid? This essay aims to challenge the premise itself.

II. Historical Repetition: When Threat Narratives Drive Policy

Similar logic prevailed when Japan drifted into war in the early 20th century: “The enemy may strike first.” “We must move before they do.” These were the rationalizations behind preemptive actions, such as the bogged-down escalation of the Sino-Japanese War and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor—justified at the time as “preventive strikes.”

According to Japanese management theorist Ikujiro Nonaka, Japan’s military failures stemmed from organizational dysfunction: inconsistencies between strategy and operations, an insular decision-making culture, rigid reliance on past victories, a lack of field-level leadership, and poor information sharing.

Yet what I want to highlight goes deeper: Was the very act of “choosing war” itself not a fundamental misjudgment? As historian Yoko Kato has argued, we must interrogate the ideological and historical frameworks that made such choices conceivable in the first place.

While Nonaka emphasized the importance of “decision-making events” within organizations, the real issue lies earlier—in the cognitive process that shapes how decisions are even framed. It was the late Yushi Enta (Professor at Hosei University) who critiqued this blind spot in Japanese organizational theory and advocated for an “epistemological” approach to how recognition shapes decisions. I believe his insights have much to contribute to current geopolitical analysis.
III. My Position: China Will Not Invade

I have fundamental doubts about the “China threat theory” that is now widely circulated.

My position is this: China has no intrinsic motivation to invade other countries in the first place.

There are three reasons for this:

For a giant nation like China, engaging in a military invasion carries a tremendous risk, as it could ignite deep-rooted ethnic and demographic tensions within.
China’s current top national priority is domestic stability and economic growth, and any external military conflict would clearly undermine those objectives.
Much of the hardline rhetoric from the Xi Jinping administration appears to be aimed at domestic audiences, functioning more as performance than as a concrete strategic doctrine.

In other words, I believe it is far more rational for China to maintain internal order than to seek external expansion through conflict.

IV. The Institutional Function of the “China Threat”

Why, then, has the China threat theory become so widespread?

One explanation lies in the institutional and political dynamics operating both within and beyond Japan.

In Japan, defense bureaucrats and policymakers justify increased budgets and the reinforcement of U.S. bases under the slogan “preparedness is deterrence,” while media outlets repeatedly echo these official narratives. In the United States, framing China as a common threat helps reinforce alliances and maintain strategic primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Thus, “the China threat” becomes a self-reinforcing structure. Rather than being grounded in careful assessment, the narrative thrives on the amplification of mere possibilities—eventually conjuring the very tensions it claims to anticipate.

V. Intellectual Allies: Todd and Milanovic

My position is not based on intuition alone.

Emmanuel Todd, a French anthropologist and demographer, has long emphasized that Chinese society is characterized by a familial structure and cultural logic that favors order over expansion. He suggests that stability, not conquest, lies at the root of China’s political and social behavior.

Similarly, economist Branko Milanovic argues that China’s model of “political capitalism” is not easily exportable. The Chinese system is deeply embedded in its own historical and institutional context and lacks the ideological universalism that once propelled Soviet communism or Western liberalism.

Even if some developing nations find China’s model attractive, this does not mean that China itself is attempting to impose it abroad. I read this as a sign that China does not possess either the ideological will or strategic intent to pursue hegemonic dominance.

VI. Conclusion: Toward a New Relationship with China

China is not an enemy poised to invade others. This is my thesis.

If we begin from this premise, then we must reimagine Japan’s relationship with China—not as a fragile standoff, but as an evolving partnership grounded in mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence.

This does not imply that Japan should imitate China’s political system. On the contrary, Japan must hold fast to its own political freedoms and democratic ideals. But these can and should coexist with a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes cooperation, not confrontation.

In that lies the true foundation for a stable and peaceful Asia.

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